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AFTER  RACING  SMALL  SAILBOATS for twenty  years I have learned  that 
when one is behind  in an early  race  of a series,  it rarely  pays to split with 
the lead boats in the vague  hope of finding  a favorable  wind shift. One is 
better  off sailing  the most favorable  course,  which  usually  involves  simply 
following  the lead boats, and capitalizing  on any opportunity  that arises, 
meanwhile  consolidating  position  on the  boats  behind.  A middle-of-the-fleet 
finish is not dramatic,  but it preserves  the chances  of finishing  well in the 
series  as a whole,  while  a different  course  may involve  poor winds  and ad- 
verse  currents  that  risk  the near-last-place  finish.  A different  course  is best 
only when it is clearly  the better  course,  and then it would  have been the 
right  one, whether  one was ahead  or behind. 
In reading  the newspapers  since  August 15, I have  been impressed  with 
the frequency  of the arguments  that "something"  had  to be done  about  the 
economy  and the paucity  of the arguments  that the program  announced 
by the President  will actually  accomplish  the desired  objectives  at an ac- 
ceptable  cost. There  is no assurance  that  the new course  is better,  only  that 
it is different.  This paper  concentrates  on the wage-price  controls  part of 
the program  which,  in my view, raises  the most serious  issues. 
* The views expressed  in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily 
reflect those of the Division of Research and Statistics or the Board of Governors. 
Indeed, to emphasize  the personal nature of these views this paper has been written 
with extensive  use of the first person  singular. 
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A major difficulty  in discussing  controls  is the absence  of a generally 
accepted  vocabulary,  which  means  that  those on opposite  sides  of the issue 
are  not always  talking  about  the same  concepts.  In an attempt  to improve 
communication,  I would like to propose the following,  necessarily  im- 
precise,  definitions.  The term  "comprehensive  controls"  may  be defined  by 
reference  to the wage and price  controls  of the Second  World  War.  The 
term  "mild  controls"  means  a set of mandatory  controls  over  major  firms 
and unions,  perhaps  involving  the 500 largest  firms,  which  could  take the 
form of detailed  wage and price  ceilings,  or of a board  with authority  to 
roll back  any  wage  or price  changes  found  to be excessive.  By "guidelines" 
I mean the type of guidepost  program  followed  under  the Kennedy  and 
Johnson  administrations,  which  involves  both behind-the-scenes  and pub- 
lic pressures  but not legal enforcement  powers. 
It is also useful  in avoiding  misunderstanding  to specify  rather  precisely 
the predicted  effect  of controls.  It may be argued,  for example,  that mild 
controls  will reduce  the inflation  rate  by a specified  number  of percentage 
points  on a particular  price  index.  Even  so, this approach  encounters  diffi- 
culty  since  the meaning  of the price  index  will change  if previously  hidden 
discounts  disappear  or product  quality  deteriorates. 
Finally,  it is important  to be precise  about  time  periods.  In the last week 
of the ninety-day  freeze,  the price  level will surely  be below what  it other- 
wise would have been. The issue is whether  the price  level will be below 
what it otherwise  would have been two years,  and even five years,  from 
now. Little  is to be gained  from  trading  less  inflation  now  for  more  inflation 
later. 
The economists  who favor controls  generally  do so with the idea that 
they are a lesser  evil than inflation  accompanied  by unemployment.  The 
controls  issue  is more one of differing  empirical  judgments  about  benefits 
and costs than of differing  doctrinal  viewpoints.  While economists  give 
different  weights  to various  aspects  of their  ideals  of "the  good life,"  most 
cherish  the maximum  possible  freedom  for economic  decisions,  a reduction 
of which  is one of the costs of controls.  But  individual  decisions,  of course, 
ought  to be taken  within  the  context  of the full  employment  economy  neces- 
sary  to provide  genuine  choices  among  job opportunities  and  among  invest- 
ment  opportunities,  as well as the stable  incomes  and goods  required  for a 
widely  shared  prosperity. 
Economists  differ  widely  in their  empirical  judgments  as to the policies 
necessary  to approach  the ideal.  I believe  that the differences  in empirical 
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ease of enforcement;  (2) cost; (3) required  extent  in terms  of the number  of 
prices and wages that must be affected;  (4) required  duration;  and (5) 
efficacy. 
These  issues  are  interrelated,  and  the sections  below  attempt  to untangle 
them, and then to outline  an alternative  course  of action  that could  have 
been pursued  instead of a freeze followed by controls of one type or 
another. 
The analysis  is based  on the assumption  that the controls  following  the 
freeze  will be of the "mild"  variety.  It is also assumed  that  the controls  will 
be temporary,  that is, of less than three  years'  duration. 
The Costs  of Wage-Price  Controls 
Controls  incur  three  different  types of costs. The first  is the loss of in- 
dividual  freedom  resulting  from central  control  over individual  wage and 
price  decisions.  The second  is the misallocation  of resources  resulting  from 
controls.  And the third  is the administrative  cost. All these  costs are  inter- 
related.  For example,  if administrative  cost is kept  low, enforcement  of the 
controls  will  be weak  and  will have  relatively  little  effect  after  a time.  Also, 
it is obvious  that the costs of controls  are a function  of their duration. 
The resource  allocation  and administrative  costs of controls are not 
likely  to prove  great  if the controls  last for at most several  years,  especially 
if they are of the mild variety  and really  "buy"  lower unemployment  and 
greater  price  stability.  In any  event,  a rich  society  can bear  these  costs.  The 
important  issue concerns  the costs in individual  freedom  and the way in 
which  they affect  the nature  of controls  that are  politically  acceptable.  The 
question  is whether  temporary  mild controls  will make any lasting con- 
tribution  to the goals of full employment  and price  stability. 
Considerable  governmental  power  was  applied  when  the  wage-price  freeze 
was put into effect.  All contracts  voluntarily  reached  by individuals  and 
firms,  with each other  and with governmental  units,  have been suspended 
insofar  as they provide  for increases  in wages  and prices.  But the central 
question  about  the efficacy  of temporary  controls  is precisely  whether  they 
will have any lasting effect  if existing  contracts  are permitted  to resume 
force  once  the freeze  ends.  The cost of controls  will be high  if existing  con- 
tracts  must  be rewritten  following  the freeze.  This  issue  will  be examined  in 
the next  section. 
Several  examples  may serve  to amplify  the hitherto  vague  references  to 
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"mere  details,"  for one of the major arguments  against  controls  is that 
there is no satisfactory  way of handling  these details. To consider  the 
problems  of enforcing  wage  controls,  suppose  that a firm  wants  to increase 
the pay of an employee  to a level above  the controlled  level, perhaps  be- 
cause  he is threatening  to take a job with a competitor.  An obvious  tech- 
nique  is to promote  him-indeed, so obvious  that one of the first  clarifica- 
tions issued  during  the current  freeze  was that wages could be increased 
only in the event  of a "bona  fide"  promotion. 
What  is a "bona  fide"  promotion?  One  approach  is not to allow  promo- 
tions into newly  created  positions.  A firm is not permitted  to create  new 
vice presidents,  or new foremen,  or new senior  accountants  just to have 
more  higher  paying  slots to put employees  in. But clearly  this approach  to 
wage  control  cannot  last very  long since  many  firms  have  valid  reasons  for 
creating  new positions. 
What criteria  can the controllers  then use to distinguish  between  bona 
fide  and  control-avoidance  promotions?  Beyond  the cases  where  the issues 
are clear-cut,  many problems  will arise,  for example,  in connection  with 
corporate  mergers  and reorganizations.  To offer another  example,  how 
does a government  official  know how many  foremen  are needed  in a new 
plant  producing  a new product? 
Comprehensive  wage  control  is no easy  matter.  Many  arbitrary  decisions 
must be made. Wage  control will be relatively  easy and most complete 
over standardized  types of jobs, including  most blue collar and clerical 
jobs. Managerial  and  professional  jobs, on the other  hand,  are  more  varied 
and more subject  to change.  The inequities  will multiply,  and so will the 
pressure  for a more and more elaborate  control  machinery  to limit the 
inequities  by adjusting  wages  and salaries. 
To obtain  wage  increases  some  individuals  will be forced  to change  jobs 
because  one firm,  though  willing,  is not permitted  to grant  an increase  in 
pay, while  another  obtains  permission  for a new  position,  or has a vacancy 
in an existing  position.  Excessive  job changing  is not only inefficient  but 
also tends  to break  down  wage  control.  To combat  this tendency,  controls 
may be imposed  on job moves,  or directly  on the pay of individuals  rather 
than of jobs. 
Price  control  presents  problems  that are  just as serious.  How is the price 
on a new product  to be determined?  To set the price  on the basis of the 
firm's  costs requires  the perhaps  expensive  attempt  to understand  its cost 
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uct is unsatisfactory  if the new product  costs more  to produce  but has su- 
perior  characteristics  that are  not permitted  to bring  a higher  price,  or if it 
has  roughly  the same  performance  characteristics  but costs  less to produce. 
In the latter  case  the cost savings  are  not passed  on to the purchasers  of the 
new product. 
Another  problem  arises  when firms  face cost increases,  some of which 
in practice  will prove  unavoidable.  Is a firm  to be permitted  to pass these 
increases  on in the form of higher  prices?  If not, what happens  if the firm 
simply  stops production  of an unprofitable  item?  Will a firm  be forced  to 
continue  production  of an item "vital  to the national  interest"?  If cost in- 
creases  on "vital"  products,  however  defined,  are  considered  a valid  reason 
for price  increases,  how many officials  will be required  to administer  the 
price  controls? 
Product specifications  are constantly  changing,  sometimes reflecting 
improvement,  sometimes  deterioration.'  In comprehensive  price control 
firms  have an obvious  incentive  to reduce  the quality  of their goods and 
services.  If the inflationary  pressures  to be suppressed  by controls are 
powerful,  control  over  product  specifications  will be required.2 
Although  economists  disagree  as to the severity  of these  problems,  they 
acknowledge  their existence  and believe  that they will become  more ap- 
parent  with  time.  As problems  appear,  some  economists  will call for an es- 
calation  of controls,  while  others,  like  me, will  argue  that  there  is no natural 
end  to the escalation  of controls.  How can  these  administrative  problems  be 
1. Product deterioration  is not always a bad thing. For example, when clothing 
styles are undergoing  particularly  rapid change, reducing  costs by a reduction in the 
durability  of the cloth makes perfectly  good sense because the clothes won't be worn 
out anyway. 
2. For a recent example,  consider  the following quote. "General  Motors executives 
also said that they were  making  optional  some equipment  that was to have been standard 
on 1972 models. The change was made because the company must sell new models at 
1971 prices  during  the Government's  90-day  price freeze.... 
"G.M. officials  here made it clear that wherever  possible they would pull out items 
that had been added to the 1972 cars, making  the newer models more like the 1971's. 
For example, the company had planned as standard  equipment  to have rubber pro- 
tective  guards  running  along the entire  length of the front and rear bumpers.  Now they 
will be optional at $23. 
"Also, a larger  400-cubic-inch  displacement  engine was to be standard  on the 1972 
Pontiac Catalina, replacing a  350-cubic-inch  engine that was standard on the 1971. 
With the price freeze the 350-inch  engine is standard again and the larger engine is 
optional at $52." ("Pontiac Offering  Energy-Absorbing  Bumper for '72," New York 
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handled  without  a large  bureaucracy?  Only administrative  guidelines  that 
permit  individuals,  firms,  and  control  administrators  to know  what  changes 
in wages  and  prices,  and in job and  product  specifications,  are  and are not 
permitted  could  make a small  bureaucracy  feasible.  I do not believe  such 
guidelines  can be constructed,  and, if these  matters  must  be handled  on a 
case-by-case  basis,  will not the sheer  volume  of cases overwhelm  the con- 
trol bureaucracy?  Will the decisions  by controllers  be subject  to legal ap- 
peal, and if so what  is the case  load likely  to be? 
Whether  controls  can work  without  a large  bureaucracy  is an empirical 
question.3  In my view the issue  involved  is whether  the inflation  problem 
arises  primarily  from  relatively  few sources  of market  power,  both on the 
labor  side and the product  side, that can be effectively  controlled  without 
an elaborate  control  machinery. 
I believe  that the economy  is far more  competitive  than surface  appear- 
ances  would  indicate.  Suppose  that, following  the freeze,  mandatory  con- 
trols were placed on the wages and prices of the 200 or the 500 largest 
corporations  in the nation. Furthermore,  suppose that prices were not 
permitted  to increase  at all, and  wage  increases  were  limited  to the 3.2 per- 
cent productivity  guideline.  Assume, too, that the controls were really 
strict and all the problems  of evasion were handled  successfully;  How 
would  the experiment  work  out? 
Those  who favor  this approach  would  predict  that  the rate  of increase  of 
prices  and  wages  in the whole  economy  would  be drastically  slowed.  Firms 
with controlled  prices  would take business  away from those that raised 
prices  and thereby  effectively  control  all prices.  Since  the prices  of uncon- 
trolled  firms  would  in fact be effectively  controlled,  they would  be forced 
to limit  their  wage  increases.  Furthermore,  wage  demands  made  to the un- 
controlled  firms  would  moderate  because  the big, visible  unions  would  not 
be obtaining  big wage  increases  for others  to emulate. 
Those predicting  failure  for this approach  expect,  of course,  that some 
evasion  of the controls  would  take place.  To the extent  that it is stemmed, 
the controlled  firms  would lose their operating  flexibility.  Their  key em- 
ployees would be bid away, and in some product  lines they would find 
themselves  unable  to meet  the market  demand  at the prices  allowed.  Cus- 
3. This sentence should not be interpreted  as implying  that I believe that controls 
can work with  a large bureaucracy.  I do not believe  that controls of any type can work 
for very long without moving far in the direction  of a centrally  planned  economy and 
relying  on a degree  of compulsion  unacceptable  in a democracy. William Poole  435 
tomers,  therefore,  would  turn  to uncontrolled  firms.  Furthermore,  the con- 
trols and  the uncertainty  of their  application  would  limit  the incentive  for 
large  firms  to invest  in expanded  facilities,  further  eroding  their  positions. 
Some  find  it hard  to believe  that in a situation  of deficient  aggregate  de- 
mand  such  as now  characterizes  the U.S. economy  there  can  be a significant 
number  of cases  in which  controlled  firms  would  be unable  to meet  market 
demand.  This view underestimates  the normal amount of dispersion  in 
price  changes,  much  of which  is caused  by differences  in demand  pressures 
in different  industries.  For example,  from June 1970 to June 1971 the 
wholesale  price  index  rose by 3.6 percent.  But of the ninety-eight  detailed 
product  categories  in the index,  nineteen  had price  increases  of over  7 per- 
cent,  and  of these  thirteen  had  increases  of over  10  percent.  Also, seventeen 
of the categories  had actual  price  declines,  and of these  six had declines  of 
more than 3 percent.  Of the thirty-six  changes  that were either  increases 
greater  than 7 percent  or declines,  twenty-four  involved  industrial  com- 
modities  and  twelve  involved  farm  products  and  processed  foods  and  feeds. 
There are, of course, many individual  products  within the ninety-eight 
categories  and further  disaggregation  surely  would  show more  variability. 
I do not believe  that  the controllers  will  be able  to rely  on a few  judicious 
exceptions  to solve the problem  of excess  demand  for some products  and 
labor skills. To make many exceptions  will risk pressures  for still more. 
Furthermore,  prices  that would have declined  without  controls  will tend 
to stay up because  firms  will fear difficulties  in raising  them in the future 
if conditions  change.  I expect  that fewer  price  declines  will occur  under  a 
system  of controls  than occurred  in the period  preceding  the freeze. 
I predict  that in a relatively  short  space  of time  competitive  forces  would 
be operating  so powerfully  that the control  experiment  described  above 
would  be dropped  or altered  to meet  the competitive  situation.  If the con- 
trols  were  altered,  the uncontrolled  sectors  would  determine  the level  of the 
wage  and price  controls  in the controlled  sectors,  rather  than the controls 
affecting  the level of wages  and prices. 
These  predictions  are straightforward,  but the experiment  is unlikely  to 
be undertaken.  It simply  is not politically  possible  to place strict  controls 
on the largest  firms.  The reason  lies beyond  the political  power  they and 
unions hold and people's  strongly  held beliefs  about equity.  Rather,  the 
reason  is primarily  the severity  of the economic  dislocations  that would 
ensue  from  controls.  To counter  that  it is "unrealistic"  to set a 3.2 percent 
limit on wage  increases  when  wages  have  been  rising  at two or three  times 436  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1971 
that  rate  is not sufficient.  If wage  increases  cannot  be set at 3.2 percent,  the 
economic  realities  control  the controllers,  rather  than  the other  way  round. 
If mandatory  controls  on the largest  firms  and  unions  won't  work,  there 
is, of course,  little hope for a voluntary  guidelines  approach.  Voluntary 
compliance  is possible only when the guidelines  are very close to what 
would  have  happened  anyway. 
The  Duration  of Controls 
From  the first  days of the wage-price  freeze  there  has been  discussion  of 
"Phase  II," or of what  happens  when  the freeze  expires.  It has been  widely 
recognized  from  the first,  on the one hand,  that a simple  freeze,  fully en- 
forced,  produces  economic  and political  strains  in a relatively  short  space 
of time, and, on the other,  that if the freeze  is unenforced,  voluntary  com- 
pliance  will fade away.  A rigid  freeze  by itself  cannot  last long enough  to 
have  any  lasting  benefits  and  so a Phase  II program  is required.  Without  it, 
the freeze  has no point. 
Aside from  the issue  of enforcement,  the basic  problem  with controls  is 
that the adjustment  to inflation  by the private  economy  has proceeded  so 
far that innumerable  contracts  already  incorporate  inflationary  anticipa- 
tions. Recent  wage contracts  have provided  for large  increases,  especially 
in their  first  year.  The  price  increases  required  by these  wage  increases  have 
not all been put into effect at this time. If they are entirely  suppressed, 
either  through  economic  depression  or through  controls,  many  firms  will 
find  themselves  in difficult  financial  positions.  The upshot  of this analysis 
is that without the renegotiation  of existing wage contracts  dramatic 
progress  in reducing  the rate of inflation  will not be possible. 
To a much smaller  degree,  a similar  problem  exists with the costs of 
corporate  capital.  The cost pressures,  as seen by the individual  firm, are 
not as obvious  for debt  costs  as for labor  costs  because  debt  contracts  pro- 
vide for a constant  interest  rate  whereas  labor  contracts  provide  for rising 
wage rates. For example,  per $1,000 of debt, an extra  3 percent  interest 
costs  the firm  $30  per  year,  or $90 over  three  years.  The same  figure  of $90 
over  three  years  could  have  come about  had the debt contract  called  for 1 
percent  extra  interest  the first  year, 3 percent  extra  the second  year, and 
5 percent  extra the third year. With the steady  3 percent  extra  the firm 
expects  to have a lower profit  rate the first  year and a higher  profit  rate 
the  third  year  as prices  rise  but  interest  costs  stay  the same.  But  the expecta- William  Poole  437 
tion of higher  prices  and  therefore  higher  profit  the third  year  is necessary 
to balance  the  lower  profit  the first  year  in order  to justify  borrowing  at the 
higher  interest  rate. Except  for the difference  in the time when the extra 
costs are increased,  the debt case is identical  to the wage case.4 
During  the past five years, corporations  have undertaken  a rapid ex- 
pansion  of their  capital  investment,  financing  much  of it with  high-interest 
debt.  If substantially  less inflation  occurs  than corporations  expected,  the 
ex post  real  rate  of interest  will  prove  to be higher  than  expected.  Corporate 
profits,  accordingly,  will  be lower  than  anticipated.  Indeed,  they  have  been 
below  normal  for some  time.5  If the economy  is sufficiently  depressed  that 
corporations  are  unable  to increase  prices  very  much,  the high  debt  service 
many of them face will force dividend  cuts and perhaps  in some cases, 
bankruptcy.  If the economy  is strong,  firms  surely  will  try  to raise  prices  to 
cover  these  high fixed  costs.6 
The nature  of the dilemma  is clear.  Individuals  and firms  have gone a 
long way in adjusting  to inflation.  Wage and debt contracts  have been 
written  under  the assumption  that inflation  over  the next  several  years  will 
average,  say, 4 percent  per annum.  Even  if temporary  controls  are  success- 
ful in damping  inflationary  expectations  and affecting  the new contracts 
signed  as the old ones expire,  once  the freeze  is lifted  the old contracts  not 
yet expired  will resume  force. And these contracts-both wage and debt 
contracts-are not consistent  in my view  with  a quick  reduction  of inflation 
to around,  say, 2 percent  per annum  (GNP deflator)  and  the maintenance 
of a vigorous  business  recovery.  The  existing  wage  contracts  can  be ignored 
only  if it is assumed  that all price  increases  prompted  by the wage  increases 
have already  occurred. 
Given this analysis, existing wage contracts  cannot be permitted  to 
resume  force  in Phase  II if a dramatic  and sustained  reduction  is to occur 
in the inflation  rate.  Ideally,  interest  costs  on outstanding  debt  issued  in the 
4. The example neglects  compounding  but it is obvious that a slight change in the 
example could equalize the present  values of the constant debt cost and of the rising 
debt cost. 
5. See Arthur M. Okun and George L. Perry, "Notes and Numbers on the Profits 
Squeeze,"  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity  (3:1970), pp. 466-72. 
6. This argument does not imply that control over costs will prove sufficient  to 
control inflation.  Rather,  the argument  is that once the cost adjustments  have occurred 
in response to the inflationary  situation, the adjustment  back is difficult  and cannot 
simply  take the form of suppressing  price  increases  and cost increases  in new contracts. 
High-interest  debt is just as much a problem  when the inflation  rate drops sharply  as is 
low-interest  debt when price stability  is followed by deflation.  A pathological  example 
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period  since 1965  should  also be scaled  down,  but this problem  is not seri- 
ous since  interest  is a far smaller  fraction  of firms'  costs than wages  and 
salaries.  However,  an issue  of equity  may  be raised  since  creditors  receiving 
interest  at the old rate will have a higher  real yield than anticipated  if 
inflation  is in fact  suppressed.  The  issue  here  is no different  from  that  which 
surrounds  wage  earners  who happened  to get  large  increases  just  before  the 
freeze,  or happened  to have  signed  contracts  before  the freeze  that  provide 
for second-  and third-year  wage increases  above the overall  wage ceiling 
adopted  for Phase  II. Equity,  and probably  proper  resource  allocation  as 
well, will require  that relative  wages  and real interest  rates  be restored  to 
"normal"  levels. In the case of wages  this restoration  will require  either 
that wage increases  just prior  to the freeze  be rolled  back, or that frozen 
wages  be permitted  to catch  up. 
Personally,  I believe  it will not be possible  either  to roll back  wages  that 
were substantially  increased  just prior  to the freeze  or to scale down the 
interest  rate on outstanding  bonds issued  since 1965.  The most that can 
be done, it seems  to me, is not to permit  existing  wage  contracts  to resume 
force to the extent  that they provide  for future  wage increases  above the 
Phase  II ceiling. 
If mild controls  take the form of a wage-price  board  with power  to roll 
back  wage  and  price  increases  deemed  excessive,  some  of the problems  con- 
nected  with determining  formal  ceilings  will be avoided.  However,  if too 
strict  a definition  of "excessive"  is imposed,  the number  of cases  that will 
come to appeal  may make the procedure  unworkable,  while a definition 
that is too lenient  will rob mild controls  of all effect. 
On balance,  I expect  the politically  possible  controls  that will emerge 
will ensure  a price  performance  not much  different  from  what  would  have 
occurred  in their  absence.  To put some  numbers  into the discussion,  it may 
be noted  that  the GNP deflator  rose  by 5.2 percent  from  the second  quarter 
of 1970  to the second  quarter  of 1971.  Without  controls  I would  have  pre- 
dicted  a 31/2 to 4 percent  rate  of increase  from  the second  quarter  of 1971 
to the fourth  quarter  of 1972.7  Assuming  that  the recovery  continues  at the 
same  pace,  or a faster  pace,  I will be surprised  if the deflator  rises  over  this 
same  period  at a rate  below  2 percent. 
7. This rate of increase  may seem too low, even  though  the deflator  rose at only a 4.1 
percent  rate from the first  to second quarters  of 1971.  The prediction  was based on the 
assumption  that the business  cycle recovery  would continue, but not at an excessively 
rapid pace. The normal expansion  of durable  goods production  in a recovery  tends to 
depress  the overall deflator  because of the relatively  low deflator  for that sector. Also, William  Poole  439 
The  Risks  of Controls 
Some of those who favor  temporary  controls  share  my misgivings  but 
nevertheless  are eager  to make the experiment.  Even if the control  effort 
collapses,  something  may have been gained  and little will have been lost. 
Of course,  if a thoroughgoing  experiment  works  as poorly as I predict,  it 
should  at least end for some time the political  pressures  for controls.  On 
the other  hand, if the Phase  II controls  are not strict,  failure  of controls 
to work  may only produce  pressures  for more  stringent  enforcement.  Since 
the public  has been  promised  more  than mild controls  can deliver,  if they 
fail the danger  is that semipermanent  comprehensive  controls  will be in- 
voked.  Enforcement  of controls  of any  variety  is unlikely  to be easy.  Defini- 
tion of "goods"  and "services,"  and the large  number  of individual  cases, 
will  require  many  arbitrary  decisions.  The difficulties  and  dangers  of bring- 
ing individual  wage  and price  determinations  into the political  process  on 
top of the many economic  and other issues already  there should not be 
ignored. 
In my view,  however,  the major  damage  likely  to result  from  controls  is 
a postponement  of the achievement  of a stable  full employment  economy 
with a reasonably  stable price level. I believe that there is no feasible 
method,  including  controls  of the severity  acceptable  in our society,  that 
would  permit  a quick  return  to both full employment  and price  stability. 
Controls may have the effect of hiding the genuine short-run  conflict 
between  full employment  and price stability  and lead to monetary  and 
fiscal  policies  that are more  expansionary  than is consistent  with progress 
toward  the objective  of sustainable  economic  stability. 
An Alternative  Program 
As in the sailing  analogy,  "doing  something"  is not always  better  than 
"doing  nothing."  I am prepared  to defend  the basic  prefreeze  monetary  and 
it was reasonable  to expect a rapid growth  in productivity,  which would tend to reduce 
the upward  pressures  on unit labor costs from wage increases.  Finally, the rather  pro- 
longed period of slack aggregate  demand  would continue  to put deflationary  pressures 
on wages and prices. To say that the lags have been longer than originally  expected  is 
not to say that deflationary  pressures  have not been operating  and will not continue  to 
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fiscal  policies  as superior  to those now being followed.  But this is not to 
say that the prefreeze  policies  were  the best of all possible  policies. 
The basic aim of economic  policy at this time should  be to maintain  a 
steady  but  moderate  expansion.  The  immediate  objective  should  be to push 
unemployment  down  to 41/2  to 5 percent  by the end of 1972.  It seems  likely 
that if unemployment  is pushed  much below 41/2  percent  no forces will 
operate  to depress  the rate of inflation. 
As I viewed  the economy  before  the freeze,  what  was  needed  was a quick 
stimulus  with  effects  that  would  not last  too long.  A business  cycle  recovery 
was under  way and monetary  and fiscal  policies  had become  much more 
expansionary  than they were in 1969.  The recovery  was in no danger  of 
aborting.  I believe  that there  is good reason  why the recovery  should be 
proceeding  somewhat  more slowly than past experience  would have us 
expect;  but also every  reason  to anticipate  that it would  have accelerated 
without  additional  stimulus. 
To speed  up the recovery,  the already  scheduled  cuts  in personal  income 
taxes could have been instituted  in 1971. Withholding  rates could then 
have been cut sharply  in the fourth quarter  to insure  that the tax cuts 
entered  the spending  stream  as soon as possible  rather  than  in the spring  of 
1972,  when  tax refunds  would  become  available.  While  further  study  might 
lead  to the opposite  conclusion,  it is my belief  that  the investment  tax credit 
is undesirable  because  its major stimulus  is likely to come too late. The 
suspension  of dealings  in gold also has an immediate  expansionary  effect 
since  depreciation  of the dollar  in the foreign  exchange  markets  will tend 
to increase  exports  and decrease  imports.  I believe  that the gold action 
plus retroactive  tax cuts would have provided  the required  additional 
stimulus.8 
However,  further  action  could  certainly  have  been  taken. A strong  case 
can be made  for attacking  some of the structural  causes  of high  prices  and 
excessive  unemployment.  It should  be emphasized  that  the word  used  here 
is "high"  and not "rising."  Structural  deficiencies  in the economy  raise 
the level of unemployment  consistent  with  stability  in the rate  of inflation, 
8. While the suspension  of gold sales and the resulting  depreciation  of the dollar on 
the foreign exchanges tend to stimulate aggregate  demand, such stimulation should 
not be considered  a reason for encouraging  dollar depreciation.  Suspension of gold 
sales was desirable  on other grounds,  and the intention  here is merely  to note that one 
effect of the suspension  is a small stimulus  to aggregate  demand  under current  circum- 
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but do not by themselves  cause  the inflation.  But while  structural  reforms 
were  being  put into effect  the result  would  be downward  pressure  on some 
wages  and prices.  This transitional  effect  would be most welcome, given 
the present  public  concern  over  inflation,  and would  help to generate  sup- 
port for the reforms. 
Steps  could have been taken-through executive  action where  possible 
and submission  of new legislation  where  necessary-in at least  the follow- 
ing areas:  (1) modification  or elimination  of minimum  wage  laws;  (2) mod- 
ification  of the tax laws  to provide  for the inclusion  of all corporate  profits 
rather  than  dividends  alone  in the definition  of personal  taxable  income  of 
common  stock  shareholders,  in order  to encourage  increased  dividend  pay- 
outs  and  discourage  corporate  agglomerations;9  (3) antitrust  action  leading 
to dissolution  of large  firms  in excessively  concentrated  industries;  (4) elim- 
ination  of farm  price  supports  to reduce  the cost of food; (5) elimination  of 
regulation  of transportation  fares  and rates;  (6) elimination  of tariffs  and 
quotas on imported  goods and services;  (7) strengthening  of retraining 
programs  and employment  services,  perhaps  including  subsidies to  en- 
courage  migration  out of labor surplus  areas.10  This list could no doubt 
be extended,  but it is long enough  to give  the flavor  of the reforms  I would 
favor. 
At the same  time,  to ease  the burdens  of unemployment,  unemployment 
benefits  should  be extended  and the welfare  reform  program  enacted.  In 
addition,  temporary  adjustment  assistance  should  be provided  to cushion 
the impact  on individuals  and firms  unduly  affected  by the structural  re- 
forms  proposed  above. 
The program  outlined  here  has at least as good a chance  of reducing  in- 
flationary  expectations  as does a temporary  freeze  followed  by either  mild 
controls  or guidelines.  The program  is designed  to go to the heart of the 
structural  problems,  providing  extra stimulus  now while minimizing  the 
probability  of overshooting  the full employment  mark.  If overshooting  can 
be avoided,  a real possibility  exists of achieving  a gradual  decline  in the 
rate of inflation  at the same  time that unemployment  is falling. 
9. The increased  revenues  from this tax change could be offset by a reduction  in 
personal  or corporate  tax rates or both. 
10. This program,  of course, would not be very important  until the recovery  starts 
to produce  some areas  with labor shortages.  But now is the time to initiate  it, so that it 
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Some  Concluding  Comments 
The structural  reforms  discussed  above would generate  much political 
opposition.  For this reason  many  will dismiss  them as the equivalent  of a 
"do nothing"  program  on the grounds  that they could never  be enacted. 
I am not optimistic  about the chances  for large-scale  structural  reforms, 
but I believe  that some of them  might  be enacted,  given  the mood of the 
nation. 
It is a mistake,  I believe,  to think  that controls  will be politically  viable 
for very  long. The  fine  reception  the freeze  received  in its first  days  resulted 
largely  from  the failure  to comprehend  what  controls  involve.  Most people 
seem to believe  that the controls  will be more effective  on what they buy 
than  on what  they  sell.  My prediction  is that  the  problems  with  controls  will 
become  more and more apparent  as time goes on, that mild  controls  will 
prove  ineffective,  and that comprehensive  controls  will have  less long-run 
political  viability  than structural  reform. 
I do not believe,  however,  that an alternative  course  of action  exists  that 
would  ensure  a prompt  return  to both full employment  and  price  stability. 
It took five years-from 1964  to 1969-for inflation,  as measured  by the 
GNP deflator,  to climb  from 1.5 percent  to 5.8 percent  at annual  rates.  I 
am not optimistic  that  inflation  can  be reduced  to the 1964  rate  in the same 
length  of time while,  simultaneously,  full employment  is maintained. 
Following  1964  the inflation  rate  rose relatively  slowly  in the face of an 
overheated  economy,  because  the economy  had  been  well  adjusted  to a low 
inflation  rate.  Now the economy  is adjusted  to a higher  inflation  rate,  per- 
haps around  4 percent.  This adjustment  is not simply  a matter  of infla- 
tionary expectations.  It includes  countless  private contracts  and estab- 
lished  methods  of operation. 
Now that controls  have been imposed,  for better  or for worse,  it is im- 
portant  that  the nation  learn  what  it can  from  the experiment.  This  process 
will be furthered  if economists  will state  what  they expect  to occur.  I have 
tried  to make  such  predictions  throughout  this paper  about  administrative 
and political  difficulties,  changes  in job and  product  specifications,  and  the 
likely outcome  in terms of the GNP deflator.  If in three  years, say, my 
predictions  can be shown to have been false, I will change  my attitude 
toward  controls. 
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In particular,  they  ought  to decide  what  type  of observations  in the months 
ahead  would  lead them to decide  that the controls  are not working  and 
ought  to be abandoned.  Given the dangers  that temporary  controls  will 
prove to be semipermanent,  and that mild controls  will escalate  into a 
comprehensive  system,  the control  effort  must  be continuously  monitored. 
Since  the economy  is so well adjusted  to an inflationary  environment, 
the cost of continued  inflation  at a 3 to 5 percent  rate is relatively  small. 
While  it is not zero,  it is low enough  to be much  below  the cost of attempt- 
ing to suppress  inflation  through  tighter  controls  or a prolonged  period  of 
high  unemployment.  I believe  that the costs of mild controls  or guidelines 
are greater  than their  likely  contribution,  and that the controls  should  be 
phased  out as soon as possible  regardless  of whether  the inflation  rate  has 
declined.  The  least  costly  policy,  I believe,  is to accept  the fact  that  inflation 
-very  moderate  inflation  by world  standards-is here  to stay for a while. 
In terms of the analogy  in the opening  paragraph  of this paper,  we are 
sailing  along in the middle  of the racing  fleet,  not up with the lead where 
we belong,  but not down in last place either.  A conservative  policy is in 
order.  If we do not push too hard and if we avoid another  inflationary 
boom  caused  by overshooting  full  employment,  there  is an excellent  chance 
that  unemployment  and inflation  will both decline  in the years  ahead. 